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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Project Summary  
In 2004, the Naval Aviation Enterprise transitioned to a system of Performance/Pricing 
Models (P/PM) in an effort to support decision makers and gain efficiency in its funding activities. 
P/PMs consist of two key elements: driver-based performance management, which identifies the 
organization’s desired outcomes and the drivers that have quantifiable impacts on them, and 
predictive analytics, which identify high-leverage drivers and forecast performance. 
The F/A-18 Super Hornet has been the workhorse of the Navy and Marine Corps' tactical 
aviation squadrons for more than 30 years. However, over the last decade, the amount of hours 
flown in a mission capable (MC) status has steadily declined despite increases in funding and the 
utilization of the P/PMs to better allocate that funding. This work, in conjunction with efforts by the 
Chief of Naval Operations Assessment Division (N81) to assess the causes of this readiness decay, 
consists of a mixed methodology analysis of the following F/A-18 P/PMs: Flight Hour Program 
(FHP), Spares Model, and the Depot Readiness Assessment Model (DRAM) suite—including the 
Engine Depot Readiness Assessment Model (EDRAM) and the Airframe Depot Readiness 
Assessment Model (ADRAM). The seminal product of this research is a logical framework 
describing the relationships between the P/PMs with a particular focus on the model drivers 
determined as key to model performance. The framework serves as a foundation for future work in 
understanding the complexities of the Navy's aviation problem set. This research also illuminates 
the extent to which human decisions shape model outputs. 
 
Keywords: F/A-18, Super Hornet, aviation, readiness, performance/pricing model, P/PM, Chief of 
Naval Operations Assessment Division, N81, Flight Hour Program, FHP, Spares Model, Depot 
Readiness Assessment Model, DRAM, Airframe Depot Readiness Assessment Model, ADRAM, Engine 
Depot Readiness Assessment Model, EDRAM, depot, Fleet Readiness Center, modeling and 
simulations, MS, mission capable, MC  
 
Background 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is nearly seven times larger than the next largest 
government agency in terms of annual budget request (Headquarters USAF, 2016). The DoD 
therefore requires a more in-depth budgeting process than the single-year outlooks of smaller 
departments. Since 1960, the planning, programing, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process has 
been the DoD’s primary method of allocating resources and is guided by the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, force development guidance, program guidance, and budget guidance (DoD Directive 
7045.14, 2013). 
The long-term prediction of allocations necessitates a systematic approach to requirement 
analysis. In the Navy, this responsibility falls largely on the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Integration of Capabilities and Resources who “exercises centralized supervision and coordination 
for the Navy’s capability study analysis and assessments, allocation and integration of the Navy’s 
resources and requirements in the PPBE, and determination of technical guidance” (Chief of Naval 
Operations [CNO], 2018). Subordinate to N8, N81 is responsible for the assessment of Navy’s 
warfighting capability including evaluating the Navy’s ability to counter current and future threats, 
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) in the areas of manpower, fleet readiness, and logistics 
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capability delivery (wholeness), and other areas of importance to the CNO such as tactical aviation 
readiness. 
Part of N81’s assessment of the POM is the accreditation of models used during the 
budgeting phase by Navy resource sponsors of programs with operating appropriations of $50 
million or more (CNO, 2006). These models are analytical tools used to relate budgeted costs to 
observed performance levels. However, during recent POM development cycles, performance levels 
have not met forecasted performance for many programs and N81 has been tasked with identifying 
the potential causes. N81 is attempting to determine if current level-of-effort thresholds are 
sufficient to accurately determine the appropriate level of accreditation, the cause of variance 
between P/PM-informed budget projections and subsequent execution, the accuracy of external 
P/PM inputs, and internal P/PM algorithms and cost estimation relationships. This thesis supports 
the efforts of N81 and focuses on the subset of models that are directly tied to tactical aviation, 
particularly the F/A-18 Super Hornet. 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
This research consists of a qualitative analysis of all inputs and outputs of four aviation-
related P/PMs.  It also utilizes quantitative methods such as regression analysis to attempt to link 
Super Hornet readiness rate to varying input or output parameters.  This provides N81 a robust 
framework to build a conceptually integrated model of the interdependencies of these four P/PMs. 
Our research is exploratory in nature and intended to be a foundation of future work. As such, most 
of the research questions remain unanswered.  
Aviation readiness including, but not limited to, the Super Hornet cannot be described as 
simply a maintenance problem or a funding problem. It is a systems problem and must be 
addressed with a system dynamics approach. Unfortunately, the P/PMs studied in this research 
represent only a very limited piece of the system. Regardless of how well each individual model 
works in its own subsystem, the overall system cannot be adequately understood without modeling 
it in its entirety. This is not a novel conclusion; in fact, this realization was the basis for N81 to 
commission this work.  
The human hand is prevalent throughout the system. It is evident beginning with the annual 
data calls in which stakeholders extract, format, and submit the execution and costing data used in 
the FHP to the EDRAM model manager using his “significant subject matter expertise regarding the 
realities of Navy aircraft repair as it is actually performed” to adjust the model inputs and 
constraints (Pandolfini & Phipps, 2015, p. 6). Furthermore, due to the PPBE process, planners make 
funding decisions based on multiple factors including changing operational environments, 
budgetary constraints, and leadership priorities. A systems dynamics approach is needed not only 
to model the interactions between P/PMs, but also to remove as much of the human element as 
possible. 
Active duty positions with direct interaction with or oversight of the P/PMs are filled with 
mid-level officers who generally change positions every two to three years. By this point in their 
careers, these officers are adept at learning skills needed for new positions and can achieve a basic 
level of proficiency relatively quickly. Rules of thumb, standard operating procedures, and 
standardized languages help the officers transition, but basic skills do not give them a full 
understanding of the intricacies of a singular model, much less the relationships between related 
models.  Instead, this requires tacit knowledge, described by Nissen as knowledge which is “gained 
principally through experience and accumulated over time, organizational capabilities based upon 
tacit knowledge are difficult to imitate” (Nissen, 2006). P/PM model managers have extensive 
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understanding of the feasibility of input data for the model, but relying so heavily on a model manager 
who eventually will vacate the position poses risks. 
These risks are multiplied by what Theorgood called a “dearth of proper documentation of 
modeling and simulations (M&S) development efforts, [validation, verification, and accreditation] 
procedures, and most notable the configuration management plan” (Theorgood, 2005). Indeed, 
documentation obtained for this study was often incomplete. For example, P/PMs are required to be 
re-accredited every three years; however, a partial 2011 verification and validation (V&V) 
submission and the full 2015 accreditation report was the only documentation available for this 
study.  
The Navy can mitigate risk in two ways: first, modifications to the P/PMs algorithms and 
business rules can reduce the reliance on managers and the knowledge they possess. In the EDRAM 
example above, the manager’s extensive knowledge of the feasibility of input data should be captured 
as constraints, thereby reducing the reliance on hard-to-reproduce tacit knowledge. Second, as 
suggested by Theorgood, a robust system for depositing and retaining M&S documentation should 
be developed. All development documentation, V&V submissions, accreditation reports, input data, 
and model projections should be retained and made readily assessable not only to the model owners 
and managers, but also to analytical activities at N81. 
  
Recommendations for Further Research 
The next logical step for follow-on research is to conduct an in-depth, quantitative analysis to 
validate the assumptions and conclusions of this work, while also addressing its shortcomings. 
Researchers should focus on the entire decision supply chain, that is, from the depot to the flight line, 
in order to gain a sense of how the readiness goals that govern the depots represent actual utilization 
in the fleet. Special attention should also be given to integrating the DRAM suite and FHP. 
This research has mapped the logical connections between three of the four models 
examined, but further work is needed to fully describe these interactions. This will not be a purely 
quantitative analysis, as there is still qualitative research needed to conceptualize exactly how the 
models interact. For example, the FHP produces a flight hour requirement in the OP-20 format. Those 
hours are used to generate the budgeted flight hours and the flight line entitlement, which become 
key drivers to the EDRAM and ADRAM, respectively. However, there is not a direct path from the FHP 
to these inputs. In fact, the OP-20 report passes through several iterations which include deletions 
and other adjustments; the same is true for the DRAM inputs. This process comprises both automated 
and manual adjustments whose logic and human-based rules need to be specified in as much detail 
as possible before any quantitative assessment can begin.  
Similar investigation of the sparing models is also required. As mentioned above, the lack of 
model documentation severely hampered efforts to include these models in this work, but this does 
not diminish the importance of spare inventory to MC rates. The coming integration of the Naval 
Aviation Readiness-Based Sparing model and the fact that it was developed at the Naval Postgraduate 
School at the behest of the Naval Supply Systems Command means that technical documentation is 
readily available, as opposed to that from some of the legacy, proprietary models.  
Once all four models and their interactions are sufficiently understood, the research can 
expand beyond the F/A-18 Super Hornet. Each type/model/series in the naval aviation inventory 
represents unique challenges in terms of maintaining MC aircraft. However, similar to the way the 
P/PMs inform funding decisions for all naval aircraft, the supply and maintenance pipelines are 
shared in part, if not wholly, across the enterprise. Therefore, the relationships described in this 
research, as well as those uncovered in follow-on work, will be translatable across the fleet. The 
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techniques used may also lend themselves toward the evaluation of funding decision models used for 
the surface and subsurface Navy. 
Finally, in September 2018, the Boston Consulting Group began a four-week assessment of 
Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) Southwest operations and coordination with Naval Supply Systems 
Command aboard Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego, CA. The aim of that arrangement was 
to launch a diagnostic pilot to highlight operational pain points-(sic), analyze overall Super Hornet 
readiness and top degraders, and prioritize key issues and opportunities with direct impact and 
linkages to readiness improvement. While this effort is focusing solely on the FRC, the Navy should 
consider a similar consulting arrangement to provide insight PPBE activities for aviation. This could 





Chief of Naval Operations. (2006, October 26). OPNAV Performance/Pricing Models policy and 
procedures (OPNAVINST 5200.35). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2018, April 23). Mission, functions, and tasks of the office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAVINST 5450.352A). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. (2016). Planning, programming, budgeting and execution system 
training program. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
 
Mattis, J. (September 17, 2018). NDS implementation—mission capability of critical aviation 




Nissen, M. (2006). Harnessing knowledge dynamics principled organizational knowing & learning. 
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59140-77 
 
Pandolfini, P., & Phipps, L. (2015). Accreditation evaluation report for the Engine Depot Readiness 
Assessment Model. Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab. 
 
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) (1999), Verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of 
models and simulations (SECNAV INST 5200.40) Washington DC. 
 
Theorgood, P. (2005). Model process validation: an analysis of performance-based pricing 




ADRAM Airframe Depot Readiness Assessment Model 
CNO  Chief of Naval Operations 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DRAM  Depot Readiness Assessment Model 
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EDRAM Engine Depot Readiness Assessment Model 
FHP  Flight Hour Program 
FRC  Fleet Readiness Center 
M&S  Modeling and simulation 
MC  Mission capable 
OPNAV N81 Chief of Naval Operations, Assessment Division 
P/PM  Performance/Pricing Model 
POM  Program Objective Memorandum 
PPBE  Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 
USN  United States Navy 
V&V  Verification and validation 
 
